As the name suggests, the book's stance is embodied cognition. In my impression, the book communicates two main ideas that are interconnected. 

• First idea: in the scientific literature, there seems to exist a misconception between the terms ‘body image’ and ‘body schema’ that needs to be settled. The author’s suggestion is to dedicate the name ‘body image’ to a system of attitudes and opinions about one’s body. In contrast, ‘body schema’ is a system of body functions that relate to the operation of sensory and motor processes. A body image is conscious (sometimes); a body schema is outside of conscious awareness. A body image is, for instance, how I like my body. A body schema is how my hand shapes itself when I reach for a cup of tea. 

• Second idea: perception and cognition are shaped by the body, or more precisely, by prenoetic constraints. Prenoetic here means that these constraints are out of reach of conscious awareness, but they structure consciousness (partially). One example is the egocentric spatial frame of reference that we have and that we use all the time to interact with the world. 

Besides the general discussion, the book contains many examples of studies to back up the claims. Here are some: (1) babies are able to imitate facial gestures a few hours after birth; (2) a person who was born without hands can still develop phantom limb syndrome; (3) patients with neglect can use a neglected arm to dress themselves; (4) a patient without proprioception below the neck can gesture without visually controlling his limbs; (5) blind individuals gesture when talking to other blind individuals. The author concludes by stating that everything that we experience is experienced with and through the body. All our perceptual experiences, emotional states, and cognitive faculties are embodied. This notion, however, sets the bigger stage for revising the boundaries between phenomenology and cognitive science.

In general, I enjoyed the book; it was easy to read, and I learned a lot along the way. A particular interest for me is a discussion about free will. The author points out that our free will is temporally spaced, i.e., decisions occur not in a millisecond range but rather over the course of hours, days, and years. Therefore, current experiments in cognitive science may be able to estimate the sense of agency and the sence of ownership but not free will. I would disagree here on the former point. Big decisions essentially contain small decisions. Being aware of this, the author tries to put small actions into a larger context and states that our actions are determined by the goals that we pursue. I agree, but this, in my impression, goes in favor of determinism (or compatibilism). I also agree with the second point that cognitive experiments do not estimate free will. I see a gap between the sence of agency or ownership and free will per se. It seems to me that one can have metaphysical free will but not feel agency, just as determinism may get along with the brain construct of the sence of agency. 

Given that I liked the book, I didn’t become a more embodied-cognition person afterward. I agree with embodied cognition, but I also entertain the possibility of cognitive agents without bodies (LLM?). Nonetheless, I remain curious. I know that Shaun has written more books, and I am eager to read them.

Memorable quote: “It is not that a man sees a woman and then decides whether she is sexy; vision is already sexually informed.”

August, 2023