Book opinion
Outside Color: Perceptual Science and the Puzzle of Color in Philosophy by M. Chirimuuta
Mazviita Chirimuuta is a neuroscientist turned philosopher. My motivation to read her book stemmed not from the topic. Rather, I wanted to look at the philosophical issue of whether color is mind-independent through the prism of neuroscience. I can say I gained what I was looking for.
At face value, colors seem to be out there. It seems that objects are colored, and colors are real. This is the point of view of realists about color. They claim that something about an object makes it colored in our perception. One theory, in particular, postulates that the spectral surface reflectance is this something. Spectral surface reflectance is a property of objects, and the human (possibly non-human) visual system is able to detect this property. Unfortunately for color realists, experiments have demonstrated that perceived color does not reliably correlate with the wavelength of light reflected from objects. Although it is possible that empirical investigation may lead us to the discovery of some other property of objects that may serve as the color essence. However, it is hard to imagine how it could be perceiver-independent, as the eyes of different species may see the same objects in a different color.
The opposite extreme is occupied by antirealists. They suggest that colors are “in the head”, or, in other words, that color appearance is an illusion. The acceptance of this notion is somewhat questionable due to the subjective experience that we have. Tomatoes and strawberries have something in common, and this something is what we normally call “red color”.
The middle ground is occupied by relationists. They agree that colors are real and yet, at the same time, perceiver-dependent. One way to envision colors both as real and as perceiver-dependent is to suppose they are dispositional. In other words, objects have properties (colors) that provide for the possibility of bringing about certain sensations. This middle position is attractive given the fact that the neuroscientific evidence does not favour exclusively realism or antirealism.
The author herself endorses color adverbialism. Color adverbialism states that colors are properties of perceptual processes. Perceptual interaction between the perceiver (who has a certain type of visual system) and a stimulus (which has spectral contrast that can be discriminated by the visual system of the perceiver) has a property, which is the color. However, as the author points out, this idea is not strictly relativistic because colors are neither object properties nor attributes of the perceiver. Yet, the idea is still relational because the perceptual processes relate perceivers to their environment. Two statements of color adverbalism that can be helpful for understanding (but, at the same time, are very vague) are “colors are ways stimuli appear to certain kinds of individuals” and “colors are ways that individuals perceive certain kinds of stimuli”.
I liked the book as a book, but I didn’t like the idea. I would say that the book is nicely written; it builds anticipation with each new chapter. I liked that experimental evidence is introduced to support or undermine the view. Often, the language was of high sophistication, which I enjoyed. However, my disappointment was due to the fact that exquisitely built anticipation ended up in the form of enactivism. Maybe I missed something, and envactivism is trending right now, but I neither fully understand it nor agree with its claims. It is hard for me to believe that consciousness (or color) is something “that we do”. After reading a book, I had too many unanswered questions, among many others: “What is the ontological status of a property of perceptual process?”, “How do I measure a property of perceptual process?”, and “If I am looking for the particular color for the walls in the kitchen, what do I have in mind while I am not perceiving an object?”
I would definitely recommend reading the book to familiarize yourself with debates in the philosophy of color. Moreover, if you still think that visual area V4 is responsive exclusively to colors, you may want to read the book for other myth-busting information.
Quote: Evidence from evolution suggests that “if you are going to bother to have vision, you might as well have color vision.“
March, 2024