Agency could mean different things to different people. I am familiar with agency from the perspectives of neuroscience and philosophy, which are, to say the least, pretty divergent. Well, it turned out that evolutionary biologists have their own opinions. This time I read "The Evolution of Agency" by M. Tomasello (it is his most recent book).

The book is structured into four content chapters that follow the evolution of agency, as the author proposes. The first chapter concerns reptilies, which are described as goal-directed agents. Behavioral experiments with present-day reptiles suggest that they are able to suppress automatic responses when this behaviour serves their current objectives. Seemingly, the evolutionary advantage, that early reptiles had, was a feedback control system that allowed this type of goal-directed behavior. However, what reptiles lack is deliberative thinking. It doesn’t seem like reptiles may think: “Should I have a vegan lunch today or throw in some insects?”.

The second chapter brings about mammals, which are characterized as intentional agents. While reptiles are capable of controlling their go-no-go decisions, mammals can evaluate the likely outcomes of their decisions. This kind of behavior has been discovered in experiments with rodents, when, for instance, before making a choice, the squirrel will pause, possibly to simulate outcomes. The evolutionary step that has been achieved at that point is the emergence of executive functions, such as working memory. Though a squirrel may evaluate if it is better to jump to the next tree or make a longer route via the ground, it cannot think to itself: “What a coward squirrel will I be if I don’t jump”.

The third chapter deals with great apes, which are portrayed as rational agents. On the evolutionary ladder, great apes seem to possess the advantage of having metacognition, namely, the ability to evaluate their own behavior. For instance, they seem to know that they don’t have information or that they are in a state of uncertainty. When problems arise (such as uncertainty), they can meddle in the process to make better decisions (for instance, gather more information). Chimpanzees can learn causal and intentional relations and even attribute agency to others, meaning they understand their goals. However, they do not actively communicate with their partners and do not try to engage in a meaningful way. For instance, they don't have thoughts like this one: "Couldn't she see what I’m pointing at? ”

And that’s where we come in. The fourth chapter is dedicated to humans, who are categorized as normative agents. Evolutionarily speaking, human groups that had committed members were succeeding in inter-group competition. These cohesive groups developed a set of norms that self-regulated themselves. As a result, human behavior became moderated by reputations and obligations. In addition to atributing agency to other people, we impose on ourselves a collective agent, "we”, that directs our actions.

The book is structured well; one argument follows another, and one evolutionary advantage follows another. However, I was slightly disappointed because of the discrepancy between the catchy title and the actual contents. I feel sympathetic to the definition of agency as being an agent of my own actions and having the ability to do otherwise. The description of reptiles, mammals, great apes, and lastly, humans didn’t approve or disapprove that I have agency in my definition. The stance that the author took was that only with agentive psychology can the organism direct and control its actions with flexibility. I like this idea, but it sounds very speculative.

Favourity quotes:

“The decision-making agent is necessary, and it is not a homunculus.”

“Each species of organism lives in its own ecological niche and thus in its own experimental niche, and this obviously applies to humans as well, including scientists and philosophers.“

May, 2024